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 Recent years have seen a heated discussion over Chinese capital account liberalization 
and internationalization of China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB). Against the backdrop of a 
weak US economy and China’s growing international economic clout, there has been 
speculation about the RMB replacing the US dollar as the world’s leading currency. 
Subramanian (2011: 1), for instance, maintains that “the renminbi could become the premier 
reserve currency by the end of this decade, or early next decade”. Much of the current 
discourse recalls past discussions when other currencies, especially the Japanese yen 
(Burstein 1988, Kwan 1994, Taguchi 1994) and the euro (Chinn and Frankel 2007), were seen 
as candidates to “dethrone” the dollar. 
 China is often portrayed as aggressively trying to achieve global leadership, and RMB 
internationalization is seen by many as the epitome of China’s quest for global dominance. 
However, it is important to understand the complex motivations behind RMB 
internationalization in order to allow for a more balanced and nuanced debate on China’s 
changing role in the international economy. Understanding the reasons for which China might 
pursue RMB internationalization also is key to predicting the speed at which it might proceed. 
 In the context of this volume, what may appear to be a rather assertive, offensive, and 
systemic use of financial statecraft (FS), through which China would actively be redefining 
the global currency structure by promoting an increased global use of the RMB and displacing 
the US dollar, is argued to have additional layers of meaning within China’s domestic 
political economy. As discussed below, RMB internationalization has been triggered mostly 
by China’s domestic need for financial reform along with the country’s defensive reaction to 
its excessive dependence on the US dollar. Hence at present, the Chinese “challenge” to the 
existing global currency hierarchy through RMB internationalization comes largely from the 
Chinese reformers’ desire to restructure the country’s rigid and inefficient financial sector and 
improve the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. 
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 This chapter reviews the current state of RMB internationalization and highlights the 
links between capital account opening and RMB convertibility, on the one hand, and the 
controversies within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership over the speed of 
economic and financial liberalization, on the other. I argue that the Chinese discussion about 
RMB internationalization is mainly motivated by domestic debates about financial sector 
reform. In particular, the widely popular notion of establishing the RMB as a global currency 
has been promoted by those seeking domestic financial reform as a way to overcome the 
reform resistance coming from various factions within the Chinese government and economy. 
International currency policy is therefore primarily used for the purpose of achieving 
domestic policy goals, rather than for changing the global financial order or supporting larger 
foreign policy goals. My argument thus relates to earlier literature on China’s economic 
opening and reform, much of which highlighted “domestic politics [as] the primary source of 
policy changes in China’s reform and opening” (Moore 2002: 35). 
 The chapter is structured as follows. After briefly reviewing the literature on 
international currencies in Section 1, Section 2 summarizes the incremental steps toward 
currency internationalization that the Chinese authorities have taken thus far. Section 3 
analyzes the political economy of China’s domestic financial market and capital account 
reforms and establishes the link to the discussion on RMB internationalization. It suggests 
that neither a foreign policy lens nor a purely economic efficiency one captures key elements 
in the decision-making process of today’s Chinese leadership; instead, domestic political 
economy considerations appear to play a major role. While there are domestic interests that 
support RMB internationalization, they are opposed by powerful party factions, state-banks, 
and state-owned enterprise constituencies that perceive themselves as likely to lose from such 
policies. Section 4 discusses China’s broader ambitions to augment its stature in the regional 
and global economy, and discusses the ways in which FS – the active use of monetary and 
financial instruments, including promotion of the RMB as an international reserve currency – 
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has been employed to pursue this foreign policy goal. My conclusion argues that a rapid and 
comprehensive liberalization of China’s capital account is improbable. It is therefore equally 
unlikely that the RMB will take on the dollar’s role as the premier investment and reserve 
currency anytime soon, even as the RMB is established as a leading currency for trade. The 
likeliest scenario in the next two decades is the emergence of a multi-polar international 
monetary system, with the US dollar, the euro, and the RMB in the lead roles and smaller 
regional lead currencies in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia in the 
second tier. 
 
I. International reserve and investment currencies 
 The international monetary system is characterized by currency competition and a 
hierarchy of currencies. Cohen (1998: 114) compares currency competition to a “vast, three-
dimensional pyramid: narrow at the top, where a few popular currencies dominate; 
increasingly broad below, reflecting varying degrees of competitive inferiority.” Several 
factors establish a currency’s rank in this international currency hierarchy, and whether a 
currency will be able to become a major international or “global” currency, which will be 
used not only as invoicing currency for trade, but that will also be a major investment 
currency in the portfolios of international investors and reserve currency held by central 
banks.1 
 As Minsky (1986: 228) observed, “everyone can create money; the problem is to get it 
accepted.” The easiest way to have one’s IOUs accepted is to generate liabilities for others 
that can only be extinguished through possession of these IOUs (Kregel 2006). A government 
can domestically enforce the acceptance of its currency through the fiscal system (and up to a 
                                                           
1 Thimann (2010) distinguishes between global and international currencies, where the former are currencies 
that play a major role in the global economy, while the latter are currencies that are used outside the constituency 
where they are issued. 
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certain degree through its legal system) by creating a tax liability on its citizens that can only 
be redeemed in the form of money issued by the government. But this does not work 
internationally, as a government can tax its own citizens, who are subject to government 
regulations, but cannot force non-residents to hold claims. The only way to make the currency 
internationally accepted is by building an expectation that these liabilities will act as perfect 
substitutes for the liabilities of other countries’ monetary authorities. 
 A number of conditions can be identified that contribute to building such expectations. 
First, confidence in a currency’s future value is dependent on the political stability of the 
country of origin (Cohen 2000). This is the quintessential precondition for establishing a track 
record of relatively low inflation and low inflation variability. Second, countries need sound 
and credible fiscal institutions. In conjunction with noninflationary wage and price policies, a 
sound fiscal framework lays the groundwork for a noninflationary monetary environment with 
low nominal as well as real interest rates. Third, countries need to establish credible monetary 
regimes. Unpredictable monetary policy makes market participants unsure about the future 
real value of their assets issued in domestic currency and may lead them to denominate them 
in international currency (Jeanne 2005). Establishing a strong, (de facto) independent central 
bank with strong inflation aversion and a clear monetary policy objective is an important way 
to pin down inflationary expectations and to reduce this uncertainty. 
 Fourth, avoiding international debt, and instead striving for a surplus in the trade and 
current account helps to create expectations of an appreciation of the national currency. From 
a long-term development perspective, it is not the short-term stabilization of the exchange rate 
that is of central importance but rather the currency’s long-term value. The quality of a 
nation’s currency is undermined when a currency regime is chosen that achieves price and 
exchange rate stabilization at the cost of an increase in the country’s foreign debt. Instead, 
countries need to develop the ability to generate foreign reserves by generating export 
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surpluses.2 Such a strategy is helped by a tendency toward an undervaluation of the currency, 
as illustrated by the successful adopters of this development strategy such as West Germany 
in the 1950s and Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. The East Asian tiger economies – and then 
China – have very successfully followed this strategy more recently. 
 But developing sound fiscal and monetary institutions and generating export surpluses 
will not suffice to achieve key currency status. The literature on the determinants of key 
currency status points to another factor, namely the size of the economy. Matsuyama, 
Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) explain the international use of currencies and, succinctly, the 
determinants of key currency status as a function of relative country size and the degree of 
international economic integration. Because of network externalities and transaction costs, the 
global portfolio is concentrated in only a handful of currencies. In some ways money is 
comparable to language, whose usefulness is also dependent on the number of people with 
whom one can communicate; similarly a currency’s utility rises with the number of other 
market participants using the same currency (Dowd and Greenaway 1993). A currency’s 
attractiveness also increases with its transactional liquidity, which in turn is dependent on the 
existence of well-developed and broad domestic financial markets that offer a wide range of 
short and long-term investment opportunities in that currency, as well as fully operating 
secondary markets (Cohen 2000). Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005) point out that 
larger countries offer significant diversification possibilities, while smaller countries add 
fewer diversification benefits relative to the additional costs they imply. 
 As a result of these factors the global portfolio is concentrated in a small number of 
currencies (those at the top of the international currency pyramid) for reasons partly beyond 
the control of even those countries that follow sound domestic policies. Developing key 
                                                           
2 For example, the fact that the US has been running a current account deficit since 1982 (except for a small 
surplus 1991) has contributed to the worry about the long-term stability of the dollar an questions about its status 
as the world currency. 
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currency status is hence a very difficult and perhaps even impossible endeavor for small 
economies. Eichengreen et al. (2005) show larger economies to have less of a problem 
borrowing in their own currency than do smaller economies. Using different measures of size, 
their estimates suggest that economic size is robustly and negatively correlated to “original 
sin,” i.e., a situation where it is impossible for a country to borrow abroad in its domestic 
currency. 
 Taking into account these conditions, China certainly has the potential to elevate the 
RMB to key currency status. Assuming continuous economic and political stability in China 
(admittedly a significant assumption), China can be expected to replace the US as the world’s 
largest economy in the foreseeable future, even if the country’s growth rate slows 
significantly compared to the 10 percent annual average recorded over the past three decades. 
Although the People’s Bank of China (PBOC, sometimes abbreviated PBC), China’s central 
bank, is not institutionally independent, China’s leadership is generally inflation averse and 
likely to continue to grant the PBOC sufficient operational independence to prevent high 
inflation, given that the latter could cause social unrest.3 Last but not least, China has been 
running significant current account surpluses, which have been driving appreciation 
expectations. 
 However, as many studies have highlighted, there are also conditions that China does 
not fulfill at the moment: In particular, China is currently lacking deep and liquid capital 
markets; the RMB is not fully convertible (i.e., it is not freely tradable in global currency 
markets); and the capital account is still tightly regulated (e.g., Prasad and Ye 2011, Volz 
2013). Without a further opening of the capital account and convertibility of the RMB, the 
latter cannot assume a major international role besides being an invoicing country in (mostly 
regional) trade. Nonetheless, China’s government could, in theory, implement the necessary 
                                                           
3 As shown by Bell and Feng (2013), the PBOC has been able to gradually but steadily increase its authority in 
the area of monetary and financial policy. 
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policies fairly quickly, and with foreign portfolio capital inflows domestic Chinese capital 
markets would probably then see considerable growth. Moreover, taking into account the 
historical experience of the US dollar, which went from having no international role to being 
the leading international currency in less than a decade (Eichengreen 2011), we could indeed 
see the RMB rise to key currency status very quickly. 
 In practice, however, reform of the capital account and convertibility of the RMB are 
hotly contested issues in China. Moreover, these reforms necessarily are linked with reform of 
the domestic financial sector, since the capital account cannot be fully liberalized before the 
overhaul of the interest rate setting system, among others, is completed. The speed of reform 
is hence not yet decided. Before analyzing the preferences of different interests within China 
with respect to these issues, and what they imply for the reform process and hence RMB 
internationalization, the next section will briefly review the steps already taken toward capital 
account opening and RMB internationalization. 
 
II. China’s evolving roadmap for RMB internationalization 
 Since a number of recent studies, including Cohen (2012a), Prasad and Ye (2012), and 
Volz (2013), have reviewed the steps taken to liberalize China’s capital account and promote 
the internationalization of the RMB, the following overview is kept very short. A summary of 
China’s framework for capital controls is provided in Table 1. Major steps taken by the 
Chinese authorities toward RMB internationalization are listed in Table 2. Table 3 provides 
information on the 24 bilateral currency swap agreements that the PBOC had entered into 
with other central banks as of December 2013. 
 
[Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here] 
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 Various initiatives have been announced and implemented over recent years to 
promote RMB internationalization, including a subnational pilot program on RMB cross-
border trade settlement (later extended to the country as a whole; the issuance of sovereign 
RMB-denominated bonds and permission for the issuance of corporate bonds in Hong Kong 
and elsewhere; pilot programs for RMB-denominated outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) for residents of 20 cities and provinces; and, most recently, the establishment of a 
special zone to experiment with direct currency convertibility in Shenzhen, the city that 
designated as China’s first special economic zone and test-case for economic reforms in 1980. 
 However, as Table 1 demonstrates, China’s capital account is still tightly regulated, 
with the exception of inward FDI. Direct investment inflows still need approval, but face less 
severe restrictions than portfolio inflows. Since 2002, licensed foreign investors, so-called 
“Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors” (QFII), have been granted permission to invest in 
China’s capital markets, but they still face quota restrictions and are constrained to invest only 
in certain asset classes. Capital outflows, except for direct investments, are also tightly 
regulated or banned altogether. Although the goal of capital account liberalization was put 
forward in the 12th Five-Year Plan outlining the policy for the years 2011-15, the authorities 
had not as of late 2013 provided details on how quick liberalization should proceed and how 
far it should go, even as the goal of capital account liberalization was reiterated at the CCP’s 
Third Plenum in November 2013. 
 The discussion within China on capital account liberalization recently intensified, with 
the unveiling of a PBOC blueprint for an accelerated opening of China’s financial sector. In a 
February 2012 interview to the “China Securities Journal,” one of the country’s most 
influential newspapers, a senior PBOC official outlined a three-step plan for liberalizing the 
10 
 
capital account over the next ten years (Sheng 2012).4 According to this plan, the next three 
years would see a loosening of direct investment controls and a liberalization of capital flows 
out of China to take advantage of lower valuations for Western companies. Over the next 
three to five years, the plan also foresees deregulation of commercial credit controls and an 
increase in foreign RMB-denominated lending by Chinese banks to raise the RMB’s global 
status. In the third step, within five to ten years, China would “gradually open up trading of 
real estate, stocks and bonds to foreign investors”. By the end of the plan’s third phase, China 
would have achieved a great (yet not clearly specified) degree of RMB convertibility. 
 Even though the PBOC’s plan does not reflect the government’s official position, it 
represented the first time any Chinese government body had proposed a concrete timeline for 
RMB internationalization. The draft plan thus boosted discussion about the costs and benefits 
of capital account liberalization and RMB internationalization, as well as the time horizon 
over which both should be achieved. The costs and benefits of RMB internationalization will 
be outlined in the following section, and complemented by an analysis of who is set to 
benefit, and who to lose, from capital account and domestic financial market liberalization, 
both of which are essential preconditions for turning the RMB into a truly global currency. 
 
III. The intertwined political economies of RMB internationalization, capital account 
liberalization, and domestic financial market reforms 
 This section details the benefits of costs of RMB internationalization for the Chinese 
economy, then discusses the implications of related reforms of capital account opening and 
domestic financial deregulation, and the overall political economy of Chinese financial 
reforms across these various arenas. It concludes with a brief recap of the current reform 
policies. 
                                                           
4 The plan is based on an unpublished research project conducted by the PBOC’s Statistics Department. 
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Benefits and costs of RMB internationalization 
 From a Chinese perspective, there are several potential benefits of RMB 
internationalization.5 Besides the political prestige of issuing a global key currency, benefits 
for Chinese firms arise if they can use the domestic currency for international transactions, 
which means that they can shift exchange rate risk to their trading partners and hence need not 
hedge. 6  Wider RMB use also would improve Chinese financial firms’ international 
competitiveness. As the international use of the RMB expanded, international loans and 
investments increasingly would be executed through Chinese financial institutions, which 
would also help to boost Shanghai as a financial center (Gao and Yu 2011). Furthermore, 
China would earn additional seignorage through the international use of the RMB.7 
 There are, however, also costs of currency internationalization. First, greater 
international use of a currency implies that international demand for that currency will 
increase beyond what is needed for domestic uses, which will tend to drive up the currency’s 
value, reducing export competitiveness. For this reason the German Bundesbank and the Bank 
of Japan both opposed larger international roles for the deutschmark and the yen, respectively. 
Given the constant stream of capital inflows into US financial markets over the past decades, 
which have generated pressure for dollar appreciation and eroded the competitiveness of US 
exports, Pettis (2011) referred to the dollar’s special status as an exorbitant burden, a 
                                                           
5 For an overview of the costs and benefits of international currencies see, for instance, Cohen (1971, 2000, 
2012b). 
6 Chinese firms engaging in international trade did not face any exchange rate risk between 1994 and July 2005, 
when the RMB was pegged to the dollar at an exchange rate of 8.28 RMB to the dollar, or between July 2008 
and June 2010, when China reinstalled a tight peg against the dollar in the face of the global financial crisis, at a 
rate of 6.8 RMB to the dollar. However, a freely-floating RMB would expose Chinese firms to currency risk if 
transactions are denominated in foreign currency. 
7 According to estimates by Jefferson (1998), total seignorage earnings in the US may amount to as much as 3 
percent of total annual tax revenue or 0.5 percent of GDP. Since the 1990s more than 50 percent of US dollars 
have circulated outside the US. 
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refutation of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s famous characterization of the dollar’s special role as 
a “privilège exorbitant.” 
 For China, full RMB internationalization eventually would also imply an end to the 
dollar link, which likely (although not necessarily) would result in significant appreciation 
against the US dollar. Chinese export industries, supported by the powerful National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the macroeconomic management agency 
under the State Council, and the Ministry of Commerce, have long been trying to prevent this 
from happening.8 
 Second, a currency’s greater international use to some degree compromises monetary 
policy independence, as it makes more difficult for the central bank to control the domestic 
money supply. The German and Japanese monetary authorities, for instance, tried to increase 
their influence over the money supply by imposing controls on capital flows in the 1970s and 
into the 1980s (Tavlas 1991: 36-37; Schobert and Yu forthcoming). In the US, former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan repeatedly complained that the steady inflow of capital 
into US financial markets made it impossible for the Fed to raise long-term bond yields. 
 In the case of China the situation looks a bit different, since China’s monetary policy 
autonomy already has been compromised by the current link to the US dollar (Reade and 
Volz 2012). While employing capital controls and relying on instruments other than the 
interest rate have granted the PBOC leeway to exert relatively autonomous monetary policy, 
the current arrangement has serious costs. In particular, the PBOC has been constrained in its 
ability to use interest rate policy effectively. It must keep interest rates low to avoid attracting 
capital inflows, which would put upward pressure on the country’s exchange rate and require 
the PBOC to intervene in the foreign exchange market and sterilize these interventions 
through open market operations. It is hence understandable that the PBOC has been seeking to 
                                                           
8 On the politics shaping China’s exchange rate policy see Kaplan (2006) and Liew and Wu (2007). 
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push reform of the exchange rate regime with a view to strengthening of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism and overcoming the need to continuously accumulate dollar reserves 
– which comes at great cost for the Chinese economy. On a more general level, RMB 
internationalization can be thus seen a means to overcome the dependency on the US dollar. 
Keeping nominal interest rates low has led to negative real interest rates for deposits. 
The average annual real return on one-year deposits in Chinese banks has been negative since 
2003, in contrast to an average annual real return of 3 percent over the period 1997-2003 
(Lardy 2012a). These negative real deposit rates are an implicit “financial repression tax 
imposed on Chinese households” (Pettis 2012: 9), since they reduce households’ income from 
their financial investments. Besides depressing household income, low interest rates have 
arguably contributed to the build-up of the country’s property bubble, by causing a much 
larger allocation of investment into real estate, where real returns on property investment have 
been much higher than those on bank deposits. The prevailing exchange rate system has thus 
contributed to serious distortions in capital allocation and exacerbated macroeconomic 
imbalances of the Chinese economy (Lardy 2012a; Ito and Volz 2013). Hence, reforms 
related to RMB internationalization addressing these problems would yield benefits in terms 
of macroeconomic rebalancing and improved financial stability. 
 
Winners and losers from capital account opening and domestic financial liberalization 
Since exchange rate and capital account reform have ramifications for domestic 
interest rate liberalization and hence for reform of China’s financial sector at large, the 
discussion on RMB internationalization has to be seen in the context of the interests of the 
different stakeholders that will be affected by such reforms. As is often the case with reforms, 
financial market reform in China will produce both winners and losers. Many interests benefit 
from the status quo and thus tend to oppose either RMB internationalization per se, or other 
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policy shifts such as domestic financial liberalization which are logically linked to RMB 
internationalization. These typically anti-reform constituencies include large state banks, 
state-owned industrial enterprises, the NDRC, and the Ministry of Finance. 
For Chinese banks – which are primarily state-owned and enjoy oligopolistic rents – 
the negative real deposit rates have been like subsidies. With a ceiling on deposit rates and a 
floor on lending rates, banks have gotten used to living with a “comfortable margin of around 
3 percent” (Borst 2012a). According to Borst (2012a), “Xiao Gang, the chairman of the Bank 
of China, estimated in 2010 that the non-liberalized interest rate regime in China gave banks a 
net interest spread twice as large as that for foreign currency loans in the international 
market.” With interest income accounting for 80 percent of bank income in 2011, Borst 
(2012a) points out that “a narrowing of the interest rate spread has serious implications for 
bank profitability.” It is hence not surprising that the major banks have been strongly 
opposing interest rate reform – which would be unavoidable if the capital account were to be 
opened. In April 2012, then Premier Wen Jiabao, generally considered a champion of the pro-
reform faction in government, openly criticised the “monopoly” profits of state-owned banks 
and called for a shake-up of the current system. The four biggest state-owned banks, which 
dominate the banking system, had an average return on equity of about 26 percent in 2011 (cf. 
WSJ 2012: C24). They would be clear losers of financial market reform. Not only would the 
banking sector have to forego the negative real deposit rate subsidy it currently enjoys. 
Capital account opening would also open the Chinese financial sector to outside competition 
and erode the profits banks were able to extract in a hitherto oligopolistic (state-owned) 
system. 
 Low interest rates have also benefited state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which have 
enjoyed monopoly privileges in many sectors, and which also have received cheap funding 
from the state-owned banking system. According to Unirule (2011), a Chinese think tank, 
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“easy access to bank loans at a third of the market rate” (cf. Breslin 2012a: 37-38) has been 
one of the reasons behind the relatively high profitability of SOEs.9 Like the banks, the SOEs 
strongly oppose financial market reform as they would have to cede to rely on cheap (and 
essentially subsidized) finance and face increasing competition from the private sector. While 
competition would benefit overall welfare, the SOEs would be hurt. It should be noted that in 
the Communist Party hierarchy top executives of large SOEs routinely wield as much power 
as the government ministers who formally supervise them. Their strong opposition to 
domestic financial liberalization has therefore been a significant blockage to reform. 
 Interest rate liberalization and a lifting of the restrictions on capital outflows would 
also hurt the real estate and construction industries, which have profited from the negative real 
deposit rates and a lack of alternative investment opportunities that have made residential 
property a preferred asset class (so much that this has led to a property bubble). 
 Moving toward a more market-based financial system would also require the 
government (and the CCP) to give up much of its influence over the domestic banking 
system, which thus far has been one of its most powerful tools in steering the economy (and 
which is also increasingly used to enlarge Chinese influence abroad, as will be discussed 
later). As Breslin (2012a: 36) points out, the state’s control over the financial sector has been 
central to remaining at the “commanding heights” of the economy. 
 Finally, financial market reform would also have far-reaching and in the short run 
adverse implications for public finances. As pointed out by Shih (2012), the central 
government is directly or indirectly the largest debtor of the financial system. Interest rate 
liberalization, which would drive up deposit and lending rates, would significantly raise the 
government’s borrowing costs. Shih estimates that every basis point increase of the interest 
                                                           
9 Other factors are subsidised rent on land, lower tax rates than for private corporations, and tax breaks on 
energy. 
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rate imposes an additional RMB6.9 billion of interest payments on state-owned debtors. 
Moreover, market-based interest rates may also threaten the survival of numerous SOEs, 
which would create additional costs for the government. 
On the winning side of financial liberalization would be households, who would be 
freed of the current financial repression tax. Lardy (2012a) estimates that interest rate 
liberalization would boost household income by two percent.10 In addition, abolishing the cap 
on deposit rates and increasing bank competition would improve small and medium 
enterprises’ access to credit. While the current lending rates are low, these benefit SOEs, 
while small and medium private enterprises are typically excluded from credit, and have been 
forced either to rely on internal earnings or seek credit in the shadow banking sector. Market-
based interest rates would help alleviate this problem and reduce the power of SOEs over the 
economy. The majority of the Chinese private sector therefore supports market-oriented 
financial reform since they can expect improved access to credit. Indeed, small and medium 
private enterprises have called for speeding up reforms, but generally speaking lack political 
clout. Finally, there have been also calls from private Chinese investors, frustrated with the 
limited range of investable assets in China, to allow capital outflows. 
 
Vested interests and the political economy of financial reforms 
 The pro-reform constituencies have had a strong ally in the central bank, the PBOC, 
whose officials believe that financial liberalization is necessary to rebalance the economy and 
improve the functioning of the economy at large. Moreover, it is clear that interest rate reform 
                                                           
10 This would also help boost the household consumption rate, which in turn is an important condition for 
rebalancing the economy and reducing its export dependency (cf. Ito and Volz 2013). As Lardy (2012b) 
explains: “Negative real deposit rates have had a double-barrelled adverse effect on private consumption 
expenditures. First, negative rates have depressed the growth of household income, leading to lower 
consumption. Second, in response to sustained negative real deposit rates, households have sharply increased the 
share of their after-tax income that goes to savings, further depressing the share of private consumption 
expenditure in China’s GDP.” 
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– as well as exchange rate reform – would further increase the PBOC’s authority and control 
over banking and macroeconomic policy. The PBOC has, over a long period, made great 
efforts to reform the conduct of monetary policy and push interest rate liberalization, moving 
in the direction of more market-determined interest rates, designed to improve the allocation 
of credit and improve the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Yet the shift toward 
the use of more price-based mechanisms has been impeded by the PBOC’s lack of 
independence. Indeed, much of the influence over Chinese monetary policy rests with the 
NDRC, which dominates decisions over macroeconomic policy, and the Central Leading 
Group on Finance and Economic Affairs (CLGFEA), the “advisory and co-ordinating agency 
of the CCP’s Politburo in managing economic affairs, and a core leading and decision-making 
body for the Chinese economy” (Bell and Feng 2013: 50). The NDRC, which “has been a 
major power contender against the PB[O]C in the finance sector [already] in the reform era”, 
has “fought hard to maintain its formidable but narrow power in the financial sector” (Bell 
and Feng 2013: 51). The NDRC strongly has favored quantitative measures aimed at steering 
the amount, rather than the price, of credit, thus effectively preventing the PBOC from using 
its entire monetary toolkit. The NDRC, which is responsible for SOEs as the “quasi-central 
planning” agency under the State Council and assumed to care more about economic growth 
than inflation, has been very reluctant to move forward with domestic financial market 
reform. 
 Another direct challenger to  the PBOC’s pro-financial liberalization position has been 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), with which the PBOC has fought a “turf war” over authority 
over financial reform since 2003 (Bell and Feng 2013). Until the present, the MOF has 
retained control of the “Big Four” state-owned commercial banks (Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of 
China) through its control over Central Huijin Investment Ltd., a state-owned investment 
company established in 2003. 
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 Even though most economists (including those within China) would agree that 
financial market reform is needed and that it would benefit the overall economy, expert 
opinion differs as to the urgency and ideal sequencing of reforms. Moreover, reforms are 
hampered by the vested interests of the beneficiaries of the current system. As Huang (2012) 
observes, “policymaking is not as unified as it seems to the amateur observer”, and 
“[r]esponsibilities are compartmentalised under different senior leaders and “leading groups” 
and therefore they are vulnerable to capture by vested interests.” 
 The NDRC and other branches of government that are hesitant to move ahead with 
financial market reform and capital account opening regularly point to the dangers that capital 
account opening can bring for financial stability. Indeed, a fast liberalization of the capital 
account entails the risk of financial crisis, as seen by the crises experienced in countries like 
South Korea and Mexico shortly after financial opening. It is particularly risky to open too 
fast without having a sound domestic financial sector and a well-developed capital market – 
as is the case in present China. Since financial and economic crisis could cause social unrest 
and political instability, and threaten the survival of the current political system, it is unlikely 
that the reformers will be able to go forth with a swift liberalization and economic reform. 
 Against this backdrop, coming forward with the above-mentioned three-step plan for 
liberalizing the capital account over the next decade can be seen as an affirmation by the 
PBOC of the irreversible goal of RMB internationalization in response to recent increasing 
domestic doubts and debates (Gao and Volz 2012). It also transmits the message that the 
strategic time for China to open up its capital account is now, and that the risks of opening are 
controllable. The PBOC downplays the risks of opening the capital account and argues that 
the need to establish preconditions such as domestic interest rate marketization, the 
introduction of greater exchange rate flexibility, and similar policies before capital account 
opening should not be over-emphasized. Specifically, the PBOC has highlighted four reasons 
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why the potential risks of financial opening are small (cf. Gao 2012): (1) the risk of currency 
mismatches is limited since both the assets and the liabilities of Chinese commercial banks 
are mainly denominated in domestic currency; (2) Chinese foreign reserves are mainly 
invested in bond markets, so that market fluctuations have minimal impact on revenues; (3) 
short-term foreign liabilities account for a small portion of China’s overall foreign debt; and 
(4) domestic property and asset price developments are under control. 
 There is no doubt that PBOC is aware of the risks of current account opening. Hence, 
one can safely assume that it does not actually expect the proposed reforms to proceed within 
its suggested time frame, in the context  of determined resistance from the anti- reform camp. 
Given the public’s benign view on RMB internationalization as a reflection of China’s 
growing statue in the world, the current debate on RMB internationalization may be 
understood as an attempt of the PBOC to push for domestic financial market reform – which 
is the precondition for current account opening – and also for a reform of monetary and 
exchange rate policy (Gao and Volz 2012).11 Some would even argue that PBOC Governor 
Zhou Xiaochuan “conned” CCP leaders when he convinced them “in 2009 to try to make the 
yuan an international standard” by using “the language of economic nationalism to push an 
agenda that ultimately would loosen state control of the economy by making the yuan […] 
more dependent on market forces than government orders” (Davies 2011). Davies (2011): 
referred to this approach as “a Trojan horse strategy: Make the policy arguments so attractive 
that decision makers will approve the ideas without realizing the implications – like the 
Trojans accepting that beautiful horse from the Greeks without realizing what was inside.” 
 The PBOC’s announced tentative three-stage liberalization plan thus may have been in 
the nature of a trial balloon to test for public sentiment on this matter – with the Chinese 
public’s responses including both applause and anger. As noted by Gao (2012: 10-11), 
                                                           
11 On the sequencing of reforms, see Yu (2012). 
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immediately after the PBOC publicized its three-stage plan, “an instant critique appeared in 
both Chinese and overseas media,” with some pundits comparing the proposed current 
account liberalization to an “opening of the floodgate” and inviting foreign “wolves” into the 
Chinese “sheep’s house.” Reformers utilize the RMB internationalization discussion as a 
means of fostering financial sector reform, similar to the way that the earlier goal of China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was used to push through far-reaching 
economic reforms in the late 1990s.12 This discourse is still ongoing, and the speed at which 
the reforms will move ahead is not yet determined. To overcome opposition to reforms, the 
new Chinese leadership will have to show “political courage to deal with vested interests” and 
the willingness “to cushion the cost of change for those who will lose out in the reform 
process” (Huang 2012). 
 However, sooner or later policymakers will need to enact some type of financial 
reform. The problems associated with the current financial repression are building up, and the 
case for financial market reforms, especially interest rate reform, is becoming ever stronger. 
The negative real interest rates offered on deposits have led investors to consider alternative 
financial investments.13 Increasingly, banks have to compete for funds by offering so-called 
“wealth management products,” which are short-term savings instruments with yields higher 
than the regulated deposit rates. While wealth management products offer choices for more 
                                                           
12 According to Chow (2003), “[t]he main motivation of Premier Zhu Rongji in promoting China’s entry into 
WTO was to use foreign competition to speed up economic reform in both the industrial and service sectors”, 
where reforms had slowed down in the late 1990s “because of the inertia coming from vested interests of a group 
of formerly appointed managers holding on their positions”. On reforms in the agricultural and financial sector 
ahead of China’s WTO entry see Lin (2000). 
13 As a recent article in the Financial Times put it, “[p]ublic anger is mounting at the banks’ huge profits and 
their monopolistic power. It is not quite Occupy Jinrongjie (Financial Street) in Beijing, but regulators are 
finding themselves on the back foot as they try to defend banks. […] Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
the country’s largest bank, has recorded average profit growth of 35 per cent over the past five years. […] China 
has been spared the expense of a direct bailout, but the rules that cap deposit rates and limit bank competition 
add up to a large hidden tax on savers. […] More worrying for China’s mollycoddled banks is that popular 
frustration is beginning to turn into action that could hurt them: not complaints or protests, but withdrawal of 
money. Savers are depositing cash outside traditional bank accounts in a growing array of “wealth management 
products”. These offer savers higher deposit rates, forcing banks to compete on interest rates, eroding margins 
and denting profits. While far from a crisis yet, it is an alarming trend for banks. Public anger, not pure 
economics, might be the undoing of the Chinese banking model.” (Rabinovitch 2012: 20) 
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affluent investors and reduce the profit margins of banks – which in the view of some 
“amounts to a de-facto liberalisation of interest rates” (The Economist 2012) – the 
proliferation of such structured and largely unregulated investment vehicles also leads to a 
build-up of risk in the (shadow) financial system. 
 Furthermore, financial repression and the constrained access to formal credit for small 
and medium enterprises has caused the informal financial sector to mushroom. By some 
accounts, at least one-quarter of all financial transactions are now carried out in the informal 
financial sector (Ayyagari et al. 2010). A 2013 report by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences put the size of the shadow banking sector (comprising all shadow-lending activities 
including wealth-management products, trusts to interbank business, finance leasing and 
private lending) at RMB20.5 trillion ($3.35 trillion) at the end of 2012, the equivalent of 40 
percent of GDP, although foreign banks and rating agencies have come up with much larger 
estimates (Zhu 2013). According to Allen et al. (2005), credit created outside formal bank-
lending through alternative financing channels – including through informal financial 
intermediaries, internal financing, trade credit, and alliances of various forms between firms, 
investors and local governments – has been crucial for supporting the growth of the Chinese 
economy. However, the growth of shadow finance, which also includes loans arranged by 
banks but not recorded in their books, has created considerable risks for financial stability. To 
reign in these risks and prevent a further uncontrolled development of the informal and 
shadow financial sector, financial reform is crucial. 
 
Recent advancements with reforms 
 Despite the difficult political economy of reform just detailed, progressives have 
continued to push for reforms, and modest progress has been recently made in some areas. For 
instance, in June 2012 the PBOC granted banks more flexibility in setting deposit and lending 
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rates: while banks hitherto had no room at all to deviate from the official benchmark deposit 
rate and lending rates were only allowed to be 10 percent below the benchmark lending rate at 
most, the new rules for setting interest rates allowed banks to offer interest rates to depositors 
that are 10 percent higher than the benchmark deposit rate and make loans at 80 percent of the 
benchmark lending rate. A month later the limit on lending rates was further reduced to 70 
percent of the benchmark rate set by the PBOC. But even if this liberalization was a move in 
the right direction, it introduced only little flexibility to the interest rate setting system. 
In July 2013 the PBOC made further advancements in reforms when it announced to 
remove the floor on lending rates and allow financial institutions to price loans by themselves, 
which is a significant step towards interest rate liberalization. China’s domestically-traded 
banking shares fell sharply the first trading day after the PBOC made this announcement, 
reflecting the expectation that interest rate reform will hurt the bank’s profitability (WSJ 
2013).14 However, the PBOC did not remove the ceiling on deposit rates, which arguably is 
the most binding interest rate control (Feyzioğlu et al. 2009). Relaxing controls on deposit 
rates will have much more significant effects on the profitability of banks and the wider 
economy. How long it takes for interest rate liberalization to be completed remains to be seen. 
An experiment that has generated huge interest and fuelled the hopes of reformers is 
the financial liberalization pilot program in the city of Wenzhou, which was approved by the 
State Council in March 2012. 15  Under this program, private lenders – which had been 
operating informally before – are allowed to operate loan companies and provide credit to 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, the State Council is considering to allow 
residents of Wenzhou to invest up to $200 million abroad, with a maximum of $3 million per 
resident. If these reforms get implemented, Wenzhou could indeed become a test ground for 
financial reforms for all of China. 
                                                           
14 It also raised expectations that banks may need to raise new capital (Wei 2013). 
15 See Borst (2012a) for details on the Wenzhou experiment. 
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 But whether and at what speed market-oriented interest rate reform and particularly 
capital account opening will proceed, remains an open question. The Chinese government is 
risk-averse, and there is no domestic political pressure to liberalize the capital account soon – 
especially not at times of a volatile world economy and excessive global liquidity seeking 
returns in emerging economies (Volz 2012). Since RMB internationalization without a clear 
sequencing strategy could cause trouble for China’s banking system, capital account 
liberalization can be expected to proceed very gradually – probably at a pace that is much 
slower than the PBOC plan would suggest. This is particularly true in the face of fierce 
opposition to reforms from the beneficiaries of the current system, which have “acquired 
disproportionate influence over economic policy” and which to date “have been able to block 
much-needed policy reforms” (Lardy 2012b). 
Given that financial repression and regulated interest rates are “at the heart of the 
Chinese financial machine” (Sender 2012: 22) and a key element to the CCP’s influence over 
the Chinese economy, financial reform is hardly a minor technical change to the current 
system, but rather a very far-reaching structural policy shift and a major regime change. But 
as Pettis (2013: 3) points out, it is not clear yet whether the Party leadership has developed the 
“political will to face down opposition to any change in a growth model that has been 
extremely profitable for some very powerful sectors within the economy.” As Davies and Wei 
(2013) put it, standing in the way of reform are “many of the biggest beneficiaries of China’s 
past growth model”. Even Premier Li Keqiang acknowledged the problem of vested interest 
blocking reforms at his inaugural press conference, where he reportedly said that 
“[s]ometimes, stirring vested interests may be more difficult than stirring the soul” 
(Economist 2013). 
After completion of the “Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central Committee” in 
November 2013, the new administration of President Xi Jinping published a blueprint for 
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economic and social reforms, comprising 60 points which are to be implemented by the year 
2020. The plan emphasizes that “[e]conomic structural reform is the focus of deepening 
reform” and that the Chinese leadership will “ensur[e] that the market has a decisive function 
in resource allocation” (CCP 2013, (3)). In the document the Party also vows to “vigorously 
and reliably move marketization reform forward in breadth and depth, substantially reduce 
direct government allocation of resources, promote that resource allocation is based on market 
principles, market prices and market competition, to realize productivity maximization and 
efficiency optimization” (ibid.). Relating to financial market reforms, the leadership reiterated 
its commitment to “[e]xpand domestic and international financial openness, under the 
precondition of strengthening supervision and management”, create “[p]erfect mechanisms 
for the formation of Renminbi exchange marketization”, “accelerate with moving interest rate 
marketization forward”, “[p]romote bidirectional openness for capital markets, raise the 
extent of convertibility of cross-border capital and financial trading, establish and complete 
foreign debt and capital flow management systems under prudential macro-level management 
frameworks, [and] accelerate the realization of the convertibility of Renminbi capital 
accounts” (CCP 2013, (12)). The state media (unsurprisingly) lauded the outcome of the Third 
Plenary, with the People’s Daily (2013) remarking that “with the reform blueprint in place, 
the key now is to put that blueprint into reality step-by-step”. 
Thus, it appears that, at least rhetorically, President Xi’s administration is committed 
to sweeping economic reform, including financial liberalization. However, this was also true 
for President Hu’s administration, whose reform record is widely seen as disappointing. 
Possibly the most significant decision taken at the Third Plenum was to set up a “Leading 
Small Group on Comprehensively Deepening Economic Reform” to manage the economic 
transformation and coordinate the work of powerful ministries and commissions (Anderlini 
2013). This new body, which will concentrate power over the economy directly under 
President Xi’s control, may indeed increase the chance that reforms will progress in the 
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direction indicated at the Plenum and that they will be completed as planned by 2020. Yet 
success is not given. As Moses (2013) points out: “China’s reformers are still plodding along 
a very tough track. The path they’ve laid out is laudable, but it’s still far from certain that they 
will be able to navigate it to the end.” 
 
IV. China’s international ambitions and the diversity of its financial statecraft 
 This chapter primarily has focused on the domestic political economy of Chinese 
financial policymaking. Does this imply, then, that decisions on international financial 
choices such as currency internationalization and capital account liberalization are really not 
foreign economic policies at all? No. As discussed, the notion of developing the RMB into a 
major – and in the longer run perhaps the major – international currency, resonates well with 
the Chinese public and the political leadership. Elevating the RMB to a prominent status in 
the world economy that can rival the dollar is part and parcel of an ambitious vision to 
reposition China as the leading economic power, not only in Asia, but in the world economy. 
Although this vision is not framed as an official foreign policy goal, it is backed by the belief, 
widely held by policy elites as well as the general public, that China is now leaving behind a 
century of humiliation and regaining its deserved role in the world. Policymakers harken back 
to China’s golden era of wealth and power before it fell prey to imperial subjugation from the 
late 19th century onwards. A leading international role for the RMB resonates well with “the 
Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” (CCP 2013). 
 Given the growing strength of China’s economy and the swelling of China’s foreign 
exchange reserves over the past decade, FS has been a powerful way for China to extend its 
stature in the regional and global economy. Besides the steps taken toward RMB 
internationalization, Chinese leaders have verbally criticized “reckless” fiscal and monetary 
policy on the part of the US, which China accuses of destabilizing the global monetary 
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system. China’s international FS also includes contributions to regional financial and 
monetary cooperation (see this volume’s contribution by Katada and Sohn), granting of credit 
and aid to foreign entities through the state-owned financial system, and the country’s 
engagement with international fora such as the G20 and BRICS. 
 But despite its potential, it appears that China thus far has lacked a coherent strategy of 
international FS, as it often responds to outside developments rather than attempting to 
actively shape the international agenda. In other words, China’s FS often appears defensive 
and reactive, rather than offensive and creative. Its role in regional financial and monetary 
cooperation in East Asia is a case in point. Although China, now the largest Asian economy, 
aims to be a regional leader, it has been hesitant to fill this leadership position. Most of its 
moves toward greater regional financial and monetary cooperation have come as a response to 
initiatives from other East Asian countries, especially Japan, whose government has sought to 
position Japan as the leading economic power in the region. Both countries appear to be 
involved in a strategic game for regional leadership that has developed into a “competition for 
regional cooperation” (Volz and Fujimura 2009; Volz 2010).  
 Examples of Japan-China competition spurring the Chinese government to greater 
initiative in the international financial sphere are not difficult to discover. For instance, the 
Chinese government at first responded negatively to the Japanese proposal in 1997 to create 
an Asian Monetary Fund. Yet only two years later, it was the Chinese foreign minister who 
called on the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers to establish a framework for regional financial 
cooperation, which then resulted in the launch of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000. 
But even after its establishment, China has been hesitant to support bold moves to develop the 
CMI into a full-fledged regional monetary fund and was seen as responding to proposals by 
the other ASEAN+3 nations rather than actively setting the agenda. In particular, China has 
been reluctant to increase its financial contributions and also to de-link disbursement under 
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the CMI (or CMIM, as it has been called since it was “multilateralized” in 2010) from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Apparently Chinese leaders have been worried about the 
risk of moral hazard, whereby countries would be encouraged to be less prudent than they 
otherwise would be, knowing that the regional fund was available to bail them out.16 China  
has thereby missed an opportunity to show leadership in strengthening the regional financial 
architecture.17 
A similarly careful and defensive pattern of financial policymaking has been apparent 
on the global, multilateral stage, where China has been very cautious about committing itself 
to binding agreements or new financial contributions. China’s response to the global financial 
crisis of 2008-09 provides an illustration. While China was quick to announce a huge, RMB 4 
trillion fiscal stimulus package in November 2008 to boost domestic demand and counter a 
slump in global demand for its exports – a policy that won the Chinese government 
international praise – the Chinese leadership was slower than many other G20 members to 
follow up on the agreement reached at their London G20 Summit in April 2009 to contribute 
to a tripling of the IMF’s lending capacity to $750 billion. In contrast to Japan, the first 
country to heed the chance to sign a $100 billion lending agreement with the Fund in 
February 2009 (almost two months prior to the G20 Summit) and thereby show its readiness 
to assume international responsibility, the Chinese leadership waited until June to signal its 
intention to invest up to $50 billion in notes issued by the IMF (the final agreement was 
signed in September 2009).18 Although this was the third-largest contribution by an individual 
country (after the $100 billion each pledged by Japan and the US, respectively), it came too 
late to be perceived as leadership. Of course, Chinese policymakers rightly point out that 
China still has a relatively low per capita income, but given that the country has by far the 
                                                           
16 The fear of moral hazard is shared by Japan, the other big contributor to the CMIM. 
17 The development of regional financing arrangements has also been a means for emerging economies to 
demand a greater say in the governance of the IMF. See McKay et al. (2011). 
18 Cf. IMF (2012). 
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world’s largest foreign exchange holdings (which are largely invested at very low or even 
negative returns in US treasuries), and that lending money to the IMF is virtually risk-free, the 
opportunity cost of stepping up to the plate and announcing a big contribution to IMF finances 
early on in the crisis would have been zero, whereas the political gains would have been large. 
Of course one may argue that China’s hesitation to engage in or contribute to the multilateral 
system is due to its under-representation in the governance structure of international financial 
institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. But if anything, increasing its contributions 
would strengthen China’s demand for a greater say in these institutions. 
One international forum in which China has acted with relative ease is the BRICS, 
where China has joined Brazil, Russia, India, and more recently South Africa, in criticizing 
both the fiscal and monetary policies of the United States since 2010, and in exerting 
collective pressure on its fellow members of the IMF and World Bank to expand the voting 
rights allocated to the BRICS as well as other large developing countries (e.g., Armijo and 
Roberts forthcoming). Within the BRICS, China has agreed to commit $41 billion of its 
foreign exchange reserves to a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a $100 billion 
currency reserve pool to which Brazil, India, and Russia have pledged $18 billion each and 
South Africa $5 billion. However, as with the CMIM, China seems to insist on linking the 
CRA to IMF conditionality – another hint that China, which is set to become the third largest 
member country in the IMF, does not seek a complete remake of the existing international 
financial system (and supplant institutions like the IMF where it has increasing sway). 
 China’s reluctance to engage more in the multilateral financial system may be due at 
least in part to a widely-held view among Chinese scholars and policy makers that “Western 
attempts to enlist greater Chinese involvement in global management and governance is a 
dangerous trap aimed at tying China down, burning up its resources, and retarding its growth” 
(Shambaugh 2011: 13). But as Katada and Sohn (2012: 19) point out, despite apparent 
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suspicion and skepticism regarding global governance in Chinese policy circles, policy 
makers believe that China must involve itself in regional and multilateral cooperation at least 
to a certain extent, since they don’t wish to tarnish China’s international image “by behaving 
like a free-rider on the international system.” There seems to be an uneasy relationship 
between the desire to be seen as a great power, and the responsibilities that being a great 
power might carry with it. As Breslin (2012b: 1) remarks, “[i]t seems rather clear that China 
wants to change its role in global politics, and also to change some of the ways in which the 
global order is governed”, but it is “less clear [...] how this should come about and with what 
conclusions”. 
 In general, China has been much more at ease when acting unilaterally, and here it has 
made the greatest efforts to use its economic and financial power abroad. In particular, 
besides entering bilateral central bank swap agreements, as mentioned above, China has been 
actively using its state-owned financial system not only to grant credit to domestic (mostly 
state-owned) firms investing abroad, but also to fund foreign activities, using its financial 
leverage as a means of foreign diplomacy and a way to secure the country’s strategic interest 
in gaining access to natural resources or strengthening its commercial ties with other 
countries. In many cases, Chinese firms and banks have been able to offer comprehensive and 
financially very competitive packages to foreign governments, for instance in the area of 
infrastructure financing.19 Such financing, often in the form of foreign aid, has repeatedly 
been provided to develop infrastructure in resource-rich countries, helping to expand China’s 
access to energy and other natural resources (Weston et al. 2011).20 In the framework of this 
volume, such use of financial and monetary levers to win friends, prestige, and influence 
abroad clearly is a form of offensive and bilateral FS. 
                                                           
19 Through public backing, China has emerged as a major financer of infrastructure projects in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa (e.g., World Bank 2008). 
20 By pursuing its interest largely outside the multilateral framework China has repeatedly received criticism for 
undermining international standards, such as those set by the members of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee for the conduct of their development cooperation programs. 
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 Summing up, China has been actively trying to employ its financial power overseas, 
but this has mostly happened unilaterally. It typically has been reluctant to engage in regional 
or global initiatives. Given that a comprehensive reform of the international financial and 
monetary system – negotiated in a new Bretton Woods-type conference – is very unlikely, the 
unilateral approach that has dominated Chinese policies thus far may not appear to be the 
worst strategy, since benefits may accrue more directly. But although investments in 
strengthening the regional and global financial architecture may be more costly and not yield 
the same immediate returns as unilateral (or bilateral) initiatives, in the long run a solid 
multilateral financial architecture would be in China’s best interest, given that China has a lot 
to gain from a stable global economy – and conversely a lot to lose from international 
financial and monetary instability. Moreover, a stronger commitment to multilateral 
cooperation would also help to build trust in the Chinese leadership – and trust is certainly 
needed to develop the RMB into a truly international currency. 
 
V. Conclusions and outlook 
 Eichengreen (2011) recently observed that the US dollar went from having no 
international role to being the leading international currency in less than a decade. Similarly, 
the RMB could be very quickly accepted as a major currency for invoicing and settling trade, 
as a currency for undertaking financial transactions and investments, and as a major reserve 
currency for central banks. Whether and when the RMB will become a global lead currency 
depends to a large extent on economic and political stability in China and on the ability of 
China’s leadership to reform the domestic financial system so that it can stand international 
competition after financial opening. As argued above, in the face of strong opposition from 
various special interests and rivaling party lines as well as the risks to overall economic 
stability from (badly managed) financial opening, rapid liberalization of China’s capital 
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account and the domestic financial system is unlikely. However, a strategy of gradual opening 
is quite likely so that the RMB can be expected to further gain in international importance not 
only as an invoicing currency for trade, but also for financial transactions. Government-led 
initiatives, such as arrangements with other central banks, will support this process, but will 
not be the deciding factor. 
What have we learned about FS? One lesson from this chapter’s case study of RMB 
internationalization is that what may appear to the outside world as a rather assertive, 
offensive, and systemic use of a country’s financial capabilities – such as the not infrequent 
announcements on the part of some Chinese financial officials that their plan is to promote the 
increased global use of the RMB, displacing the US dollar – may have additional layers of 
meaning within a country’s domestic political economy. Thus one may understand many 
Chinese domestic political battles around the goal of currency internationalization to be 
disguised disagreements over the pace of other domestic economic reforms – rather than 
struggles over Chinese foreign policy. Hence at present, the Chinese “challenge” to the 
existing global currency hierarchy through the RMB internationalization comes largely from 
the Chinese reformers’ desire to restructure the country’s rigid and inefficient financial sector. 
In the short to medium-run, then, we may expect Chinese FS to continue to focus on 
bilateral and offensive initiatives – such as foreign aid tied to natural resource contracts, or 
bilateral currency swap arrangements – or on systemic FS, ranging from participation in 
regional currency arrangements to joining with other large emerging economies in such fora 
as the BRICS to lobby for greater clout in the international financial institutions. 
In the medium to long-run, however, China’s options for employing its national 
financial capabilities for a wide variety of foreign policy goals, political as well as economic, 
are much wider than those of any other emerging power. Among the BRICS countries, for 
example, only China has a realistic possibility of providing a major global reserve and 
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investment currency sometime in the future. Yet this chapter has shown why that future will 
not arrive any time soon. 
 Nevertheless, RMB internationalization is progressing, and there are already signs that 
the RMB is becoming a regional lead currency in East Asia (Fratzscher and Mehl 
forthcoming; Subramanian and Kessler 2012). Given the great importance of the Chinese 
economy and its central role in the East Asian trade production network, other countries in the 
region are now cautiously managing their exchange rates vis-à-vis the RMB, and one can 
safely assume that it will continue to play a central role in the evolving regional monetary 
cooperation of East Asian countries (Volz 2010, forthcoming). Interestingly, it should be 
noted that the RMB can play this regional role without complete opening of China’s capital 
account. For the RMB to become a serious alternative to the dollar on the global stage, in 
contrast, a full liberalization of China’s capital account will be required. But this would imply 
that the Chinese government would have to relinquish control over much of its financial 
system and economy, something the government is not at present prepared to do. 
 Finally, whether or not the RMB can displace the US dollar as the world’s major 
currency also will depend in no small part on US policies for maintaining the internal and 
external value of the dollar and keeping US financial markets attractive for international 
investors. In this respect, the incapacity of the US political system to put the country’s fiscal 
system on a sustainable path, and the resulting recurrent threat of debt default, certainly do not 
help to increase the dollar’s attractiveness. The future role of the euro and European financial 
markets, in turn, will depend on European countries’ willingness to further integrate their 
economies and financial systems. The most likely scenario over the next two decades is the 
emergence of a multi-polar international monetary system, with the US dollar, the euro, and 
the RMB in the lead roles and smaller regional lead currencies in Africa, Latin America, the 
Middle East, and Central Asia in the second tier. 
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Table 1: Framework of China’s capital controls 
Major items  Inflows  Outflows  
Direct investment   Free; three-tier classification foreign exchange activities: 
encouraged, restricted, prohibited 
Stock market NR  Local purchase of B shares 
and QFIIs subject to a set of 
limitations 
Sale of A, B share locally 
with no restrictions and 
QFIIs 
R  Sale of B, H, N and S shares 
abroad and QDIIs locally 
QDIIs, insurance 
companies, qualified banks 
purchase abroad 
Bonds and other 
debt securities 
NR  QFIIs purchase locally 
Purchase RMB bonds 
offshore in HK, Singapore 
Financial and non-financial 
firms, international agencies 
issue RMB denominated 
bonds in HK, Singapore and 
locally  
R Commercial and policy 
banks, selected firms are 
permitted to sale RMB bonds 
in HK 
QDIIs, insurance 
companies, qualified bank 
purchase abroad 
Money market NR  QFIIs purchase money 
market fund locally but no 
permission to participate in 
interbank FX market 
Overseas monetary 
authorities, the designated 
RMB clearing banks and 
participating banks to invest 
in interbank bond market 
with their legally acquired 
RMB assets 
No permission 
R  Bonds with less than one 
year duration 
QDIIs and qualified banks 
Collective 
investment 
securities 
NR  QFIIs purchase open-end and 
close-end funds locally 
No permission 
R  Prior approval by SAFE QDIIs, insurance 
companies, qualified banks 
subject to quota 
Derivatives and 
other instruments 
NR  No permission No permission 
R  Regulated financial 
institutions with the approval 
of CBRC may sell for the 
purposes of hedging, gaining 
profit, and providing 
transaction services for 
clients with limit on open 
foreign exchange position 
Regulations on sale apply  
Source: Adapted from Gao (2012). 
Note: R stands for residents; N stands for non-residents; QFII stands for Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors; QDIIs stands for Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors; SAFE is the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange; CBRC is the China Banking Regulatory Commission. 
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Table 2: Major steps toward RMB internationalization 
November 2002. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) can buy and sell RMB 
denominated shares in China's mainland stock exchanges, licensed by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). QFII investors need to obtain investment quotas from China's 
foreign currency regulator (SAFE) before they can start buying Chinese securities. 
February 2004. Retail RMB business starts in Hong Kong and Macau (following permission 
given in November 2003). The PBOC provides clearing arrangement for relevant banks in Hong 
Kong and Macau via Bank of China Hong Kong and Macau. 
October 2005. First two RMB-denominated bond from a non-Chinese issuer ("Panda bonds") are 
sold in mainland China by the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development 
Bank. 
May 2006. A PBOC Study Group publishes a report “Timing, Path, and Strategies of RMB 
Internationalization”. 
January 2007. RMB bonds (also known as “dim sum bonds”) can be issued in Hong Kong. 
July 2007. First dim sum bond issued by China Development Bank. 
December 2008. Currency swap with South Korea. 
December 2008. Premier Wen announces a pilot scheme of RMB cross border trade settlement 
with Hong Kong, Macau and ASEAN countries. 
April 2009. State Council announces pilot program on RMB cross-border settlement in five cities. 
April 2009. First cross border trade settlement between Shanghai Silk group (China exporter) and 
Zhong Ye Trading (Hong Kong importer). 
June 2009. PBOC and HKMA sign memorandum of cooperation for RMB cross-border trade 
settlement pilot scheme. 
July 2009. PBOC and other five authorities issued administrative rules for RMB settlement pilot 
scheme with HK, Macau and ASEAN countries. 
July 2009. Launch of the pilot scheme for RMB cross border trade settlement between Mainland 
Designated Enterprises (MDEs) in five cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan and 
Zhuhai) and corporations in Hong Kong, Macau and ASEAN countries. 
September 2009. Ministry of Finance issues the first sovereign RMB-denominated bond in Hong 
Kong. 
November 2009. Interbank Market Clearing House is founded in Shanghai. 
March 2010. PBOC and the National Bank of Belarus sign local-currency settlement agreement, 
the first of its kind with a non-neighboring country. 
May 2010. Rules for issuance of Panda bonds are liberalized and more issuers are allowed. Bank 
of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (China) Ltd. is the first foreign bank to sell bonds in China. 
June 2010. RMB trade settlement program is extended to 20 provinces and to trading partners 
world-wide. 
June 2010. RMB bonds extended to allow banks to develop all types of RMB products and open 
type of participation to all types of financial intermediaries. 
July 2010. Bank of China (Hong Kong) authorized to clear RMB bank notes in Taiwan. 
July 2010. Hong Kong financial institutions allowed to open RMB accounts. 
July 2010. Hopewell Highway issues the first corporate RMB-denominated bond in Hong Kong. 
August 2010. First offshore RMB mutual fund is started. 
August 2010. Qualified financial institutions (overseas central banks, cross border settlement 
banks, RMB clearing banks) can invest in China's interbank bond market. 
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September 2010. First foreign-issued dim sum bond by a nonfinancial company (McDonald’s) in 
Hong Kong. 
October 2010. Overseas institutions allowed to apply for RMB accounts for trade settlement. 
October 2010. Pilot project for deposits of export proceeds abroad launched in four areas. 
October 2010. Asian Development Bank issues first supranational dim sum bond. 
December 2010. Trade settlement scheme expanded; number of Chinese exporters eligible for 
cross-border settlement (MDEs) rises from 365 to 67,359. 
January 2011. PBOC announces a pilot scheme under which residents of 20 provinces and cities 
are allowed to use RMB for outward FDI. 
January 2011. Bank of China allowed to offer RMB deposit accounts in New York City. 
April 2011. First RMB IPO by Hui Xian, listed on the Hong Kong Exchange. 
August 2011. Cross-border trade settlement in RMB is extended to the whole nation. 
August 2011. Initial RMB 20bn Mini-QFII Program launched. 
September 2011. At the UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue Vice Premier Wang Qishan 
and British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne agree on a cooperation project on the 
development of RMB-denominated products and services in London and welcome a private 
sector-led development of the offshore RMB market in London. 
October 2011. Banks are allowed to provide settlement services to overseas entities that made 
RMB denominated investments. 
November 2011. JP Morgan Asset Management is allowed to create a $1bn RMB-denominated 
fund under the Qualified Limited Partners Program, making it the largest foreign manager of an 
RMB-denominated fund so far. 
December 2011. China and Japan sign currency pact to promote use of their currencies for 
bilateral trade and investment flows. 
January 2012. Shanghai city government and NDRC outline a plan for developing the size of the 
city’s capital markets and open them more widely to foreign investors by 2015. 
April 2012. China Securities Regulatory Commission announces an expansion of the QFII scheme 
from the previous limit of $30bn to $80bn and increases the total amount of RMB that foreign 
investors can raise in Hong Kong for investment on the mainland from RMB20bn to RMB70bn. 
April 2012. HSBC issues a three-year RMB-denominated bond in London, the first dim sum bond 
to be issued outside China and Hong Kong. 
June 2012. Announcement of plans to create a special zone to experiment with currency 
convertibility in Shenzhen. 
November 2012. First Chinese bank (China Construction Bank) issues RMB-denominated bond in 
London. 
January 2013. Qianhai, a special zone located in the western part of Shenzhen, is allowed to 
launch China's first cross-border RMB lending programme (with Hong Kong). 15 banks in Hong 
Kong – nine branches of mainland lenders and six foreign banks – sign $320m RMB loans to 
Chinese mainland firms relating to 26 projects registered in Qianhai. 
May 2013. The State Council announces that by the end of the year the government would outline 
a plan for full convertibility of the RMB. 
July 2013. The State Council announces the intention to establish a pilot zone in Shanghai as a 
test ground for financial reforms, including interest rate liberalization and full convertibility of the 
RMB. 
October 2013. Singapore-based investors are allowed to buy RMB-denominated securities. 
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November 2013. China’s biggest bank (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) issues its first 
dim sum bond in London. 
Source: Based on Volz (2013) and Prasad and Ye (2012) and amended and updated by the 
author.  
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Table 3: Bilateral swap agreements with other central banks (as of December 2013) 
Country/area Amount (in billion RMB) Date of agreement Expiration date 
Albania 2 September 2013 September 2016 
Argentina 70 March 2009 March 2012 
Australia 200 March 2012 March 2015 
Belarus 20 March 2009 March 2012 
Brazil 190 March 2013 March 2016 
Eurozone (ECB) 350 October 2013 October 2013 
Hong Kong 200 
400 
January 2009 
November 2011 
January 2012 
November 2014 
Hungary 10 September 2013 September 2016 
Iceland 3.5 June 2010 June 2013 
Indonesia 100 March 2009 March 2012 
Kazakhstan 7 June 2011 June 2014 
Korea 180 
360 
360 
December 2008 
October 2011 
June 2013 
December 2011 
October 2014 
October 2017 
Malaysia 80 
180 
February 2009 
February 2012 
February 2012 
February 2015 
Mongolia 5 
10 
May 2011 
March 2012 
May 2014 
May 2014 
New Zealand 25 April 2011 April 2014 
Pakistan 10 December 2011 December 2014 
Russia Local currency 
settlement 
agreement, no 
limitation 
June 2011  
Singapore 150 
300 
July 2010 
March 2013 
July 2013 
March 2016 
Turkey 10 February 2012 February 2015 
Thailand 70 December 2011 December 2014 
United Arab Emirates 35 January 2012 January 2015 
United Kingdom 200 June 2013 June 2016 
Ukraine 15 June 2012 June 2015 
Uzbekistan 0.7 April 2011 April 2014 
Source: Compiled by author with enhanced and updated data from Garcia-Herrero and Xia 
(2013). 
 
